Artigos

Compendium of Country Examples and Lessons Learned from Applying the Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems

Autor/Editor: OCDE Journal of Development

Data: 2009 | Idioma: Inglês

Resumo: “This paper presents the experiences and the lessons learned by 22 partner countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia related to the application of the Methodology for the Assessment of National Procurement Systems of the OECD/DAC Joint Venture on Procurement. The Methodology was developed and approved for field testing in 2006 as an input for implementing the Paris Declaration agenda and to assist in strengthening country procurement systems. It is the result of the joint efforts of multilateral and bilateral development partners and of partner countries from around the world.” URL

Corporate Governance and Public Corruption

Autor/Editor: Ana Cusolito/The World Bank

Data: 2010| Idioma: Inglês                                                                              

Resumo: “Corporate governance in the private sector and corruption are important for economic development and private sector development. This paper investigates how corporate governance in private-sector media companies can affect public corruption. The analytical framework, based on models of corporate governance, identifies two channels through which media ownership concentration affects corruption: an owner effect, which discourages corruption and a competition-for-control effect that enhances it. When the ownership structure of a newspaper has a majority shareholder, the first effect dominates and corruption decreases as ownership becomes more concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders.” URL

Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review

Autor/Editor: Sheheryar Banuri, Catherine Eckel/The World Bank

Data: 2012 | Idioma: Inglês                                                                               

Resumo: “Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results.” URL

Misunderestimating Corruption

Autor/Editor: Aart Kraay, Peter Murrell/ The World Bank

Data: 2013 | Idioma: Inglês                                                                           

Resumo: “Estimates of the extent of corruption rely largely on self-reports of individuals, business managers, and government officials. Yet it is well known that survey respondents are reticent to tell the truth about activities to which social and legal stigma are attached, implying a downward bias in survey-based estimates of corruption. This paper develops a method to estimate the prevalence of reticent behavior, in order to isolate rates of corruption that fully reflect respondent reticence in answering sensitive questions. The method is based on a statistical model of how respondents behave when answering a combination of conventional and random-response survey questions.” URL

The Silence of Corruption : Identifying Underreporting of Business Corruption through Randomized Response Techniques

Autor/Editor: Nathan M. Jensen, Aminur Rahman/The World Bank

Data: 2011| Idioma: Inglês                                                                              

Resumo: “Research on the economic consequences of corruption has been hampered by the inability to directly measure corruption. Using an innovative methodology that allows respondents to report individual experiences with corruption while minimizing self-incrimination and an objective diagnostic to evaluate lying (false responses), this paper explores the extent of business corruption in Bangladesh.” URL

When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption

Autor/Editor: Kaushik Basu, Tamara McGavock, Boyang Zhang/The World Bank

Data: 2013 | Idioma: Inglês                                                                             

Resumo: “The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs  — maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing the environmental safeguards required by law — such that honest players are driven out of the market when the market becomes sufficiently competitive.” URL